An article by Dr Gareth Evans, from November 2017,  caught our attention this week.

The article centered on the UK’s ambitions to reinvigorate a national shipbuilding program to support reassertion of maritime power, summarised below by section, might give many pause-for-thought in the context of Australia’s ambitious continuous shipbuilding program.

Introduction

• After decades of budget cutting, the UK’s Defence Secretary expressed an intent to re-establish the UK’s maritime power, while acknowledging the economic benefits of enlarging the current UK shipbuilding industry.
• An effective monopoly currently exists within the UK for building warships, belonging to BAE Systems.
• Regional shipbuilders are already experiencing a renaissance, through market diversification such as general marine engineering and marine renewable energy.

Competition and Work Sharing

• Design of all Royal Navy warships will remain a sovereign asset, with the proposed Type 31e frigate to be built observing a £250m cost-cap for each ship.
• Fabrication of the Type 31e frigate is intended for several UK shipyards, for centralised integration.
• A doctrine of ‘British first’ will underpin procurement. The Type 31e program is seen as a cornerstone of new export success.

Fitted For But Not With

• “[the Type 31e frigate is] seemingly destined to be un-ambitious and distinctly underwhelming, with rather too many capabilities ‘fitted for, but not with’”.

Sustaining Impetus

• The (virtual) UK monopoly will likely be required to compete with foreign shipbuilders who are already tooled-up, enjoying efficient labour, and producing significant tonnage.
• The intention to reassert maritime power could become undermined by foreign designs boasting greater capability, for less cost.

So what?

Simply, political will, plus funding, plus shipbuilding does not equal greater naval capability.

Yes, financial commitment gives effect to intent, and will likely deliver new ships. However, any student and practitioner of military and naval force generation and sustainment will know capability is more than ‘shiny new toys’.

Leaving aside discussions of a Navy’s purpose and mission, political will and the necessary investment to implement the military and naval capability sought is often mismatched. Revenue raising is rarely popular so a zero-sum game, at least, needs to be assumed when procurement budgets are set. Hype is associated with capital acquisition (again, shiny new toys); however, the sting in the tail rests with enabling capabilities. In our estimate and experience, chief among those are personnel, training and material sustainment.

Naval expansion typically requires more sailors be recruited; unless a Navy seeks to modernise thereby placing trust in technology to reduce the number of sailors at sea.

Training to create the necessary sovereign skills to support increased shipbuilding will take time to analyse, design, develop and deploy. Training to operate new ships is expensive, and is often delayed, reduced, or cut during acquisition. Training sailors on procured technologies is often a just-in-time realisation. Slow capability maturation, or operational mishap once materiel is released, can push in-service training capacity and innovation to its natural limits. Commercial training will then be procured, often more costly to the price quoted during acquisition.

Sustainment of naval capability is frequently challenging, where ‘operators’ and ‘maintainers’ experience difficulties setting mutual requirements, and meeting mutual obligations – all while seeking improvements to service delivery and maximising operational use of the ship.

The bottom line is this: buying more ships to increase naval capability is akin to the phrase ‘build it and they will come’. It’s not so simple; no matter the intent or marketing. Many parallel lines of effort – and investment – are needed to properly introduce new materiel, lest an Emperor seeks to wear new clothes and answer awkward questions about projects of concern.

As many nations are recapitalising their Navies, or are engaged in outright naval expansion, the critical question of ‘but how will they be put to, and kept at, sea?’ needs asking. Answers need to be logical, evidenced, with financial commitment where appropriate, and without spin. Only then can the true nature of a new naval capability be deduced.