An article by Dr Gareth Evans, from November 2017,  caught our attention this week. The article centered on the UK’s ambitions to reinvigorate a national shipbuilding program to support reassertion of maritime power, summarised below by section, might give many pause-for-thought in the context of Australia’s ambitious continuous shipbuilding program. Introduction After decades of budget cutting, the UK’s

Beadwindow facilitates a workshop specifically for defence industry and government agencies to explore a seemingly simple question: Which came first – tactical requirement, or technological advancement? That is, what is the fundamental factor in warfighting improvement – technological development to implement a deliberately designed tactic; or, tactical development through adaptation of existing technology? The question tends to draw

We recently came across this article and it got us thinking: do the pros of owning frigates outweigh the pros of owning submarines? No matter the naval circles you might move in, it will always be a hotly contested argument. No matter their means of propulsive energy, submarines are a strategic deterrent. Certain missions will,

Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) activities are standing agenda items for a nation’s military and naval forces. Their conduct is a core, enabling, and ‘business as usual’ function. Data and information collection, from all sources, is critical for the planning and conduct of military and naval operations. Intelligence may be argued as the ‘making sense of’ a

Modern submarines are quiet. Very quiet. Especially diesel-electric propelled submarines. That makes them hard to find. Very hard. Like black holes, modern submarines can often be detected indirectly; that is not by direct observation, but detecting their interactions with their underwater environment. A surface ship searching for a submarine needs to balance its need to

Beadwindow, for some time, has preferred to define the littoral as a place with ‘dirty spectrum’, ‘dirty water’ and high probability or incidence of encountering ‘white’ shipping and aircraft. Weapon ranges become irrelevant due to the challenges of traffic, topography, acoustic and electronic propagation. A warship needs to ‘fight for the tactical picture’ to simply